The earlier volume in this series dealt with two religions of Indian origin, namely, Buddhism and Jainism. The Indian religious scene, however, is characterized by not only religions which originated in India but also by religions which entered India from outside India and made their home here. Thus religious life in India has been enlivened throughout its history by the presence of religions of foreign origin on its soil almost from the very time they came into existence. This volume covers (...) three such religions—Zoraoastrianism, Judaism, and Islam. In the case of Zoraostianism, even its very beginnings are intertwined with India, as Zoroastrianism reformed a preexisting religion which had strong links to the Vedic heritage of India. This relationship took on a new dimension when a Zoroastrian community, fearing persecution in Persia after its Arab conquest, sought shelter in western India and ultimately went on to produce India’s pioneering nationalist in the figure of Dadabhai Naoroji ( 1825-1917), also known as the Grand Old Man of India. Jews found refuge in south India after the destruction of the Temple by the Romans in 70 C.E. and have remained a part of the Indian religious scene since then, some even returning to Israel after it was founded in 1948. Islam arrived in Kerala as soon as it was founded and one of the earliest mosques in the history of Islam is found in India. Islam differs from the previously mentioned religions inasmuch as it went on to gain political hegemony over parts of the country for considerable periods of time, which meant that its impact on the religious life of the subcontinent has been greater compared to the other religions. It has also meant that Islam has existed in a religiously plural environment in India for a longer period than elsewhere in the world so that not only has Islam left a mark on India, India has also left its mark on it. Indeed all the three religions covered in this volume share this dual feature, that they have profoundly influenced Indian religious life and have also in turn been profoundly influenced by their presence in India. (shrink)

Drugs used to provide improvement of cognitive functioning have been shown to be effective in healthy individuals. It is sometimes assumed that the use of these drugs constitutes cheating in an academic context. We examine whether this assumption is ethically sound. Beyond providing the most up-to-date discussion of modafinil use in an academic context, this contribution includes an overview of the safety of modafinil use in greater depth than previous studies addressing the issue of cheating. Secondly, we emphasize two crucial, (...) but hitherto nearly overlooked, nuances to the issues: the potential for modafinil to decrease inequality and disadvantage in academic settings, and the fact that how modafinil is used dramatically impacts its effects on health, coercion, fairness, authenticity and effort. Finally, we explicitly defend the position that there are no qualitatively morally relevant differences between modafinil use and other enhancement modalities; any such differences are in degree,... (shrink)

Hermeneutics, the Bible and Literary Criticism. Edited by Ann Loades and Michael McLain.The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System. By Avery Dulles.The Shape of Soreriology. By John McIntyre.Not the Cross But the Crucfied. By H.‐E. Mertens.Verbum Curo: An Encyclopedia on Jesus, the Christ. By Michael O'Carroll.The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship: Sources and Methods for the Study of the Early Liturgy. By Paul Bradshaw.Worship: Initiation and the Churches. By Leonel L. Mitchell.The Eucharistic Mystery: Revitalizing the Tradition. (...) By David Power.Church of Churches: The Ecclesiology of Communion. By J.‐M. Tillard.God and History, Aspects of British Theology 1875‐1914. By Peter Hinchliff.Clear Heads and Holy Hearts: The Religious and Theological Ideal of John Henry Newman. By Terrence Merrigan.The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community. By Graham Gould.John Moschos, ‘The Spiritual Meadow’. Introduction, translation and notes by John Wortley.A Gentle Touch. By David Pailin.The Eye of the Storm: Spiritual Resources for rhe Pursuit of Justice. By Kenneth Leech.The Church and the Arts. Edited by Diana Wood.Anti‐Christian Polemic in Early Islam: Abu Isa al‐Warraq's ‘Against the Trinity’. Edited by David Thomas.Bernardus Magister: Papers Presented at the Nonacentenary Celebration of the Birth of St Bernard of Clairvaux. Edited by John R. Sommerfeldt.Church and City 1000‐1500: Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke. Edited by David Abulafia, Michael Franklin and Miri Rubin.‘Piers Plowman’ and the Problem of Belief. By Britton J. Harwood.Ignutius of Luyola: The Psychology of a Saint. By W. W. Meissner.Jerome Naahl, S. J., 1507‐1580: Tracking the First Generation of Jesuits. By William V. Bangert, edited and completed by Thomas M. McCoog.From Bishop to Witch: The System of the Sacred in Early Modern Terra d'Otranto. By David Gentilcore.Civic Politics in the Rome of Urban VIII. By Laurie Nussdorfer.Michel de Montaigne: The Complete Essays. Translated by M. A. Screech.Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the ‘Essays’. By M. A. Screech.Religion and Philosophy. Edited by Martin Warner.What is Faith? Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. By Anthony Kenny.Truth and Hisroriciry. By Richard Campbell. (shrink)

While various items closely associated with belief, such as speech?acts of assertion, or what have recently been termed acts of ?acceptance?, can clearly be voluntary, it is commonly supposed that belief itself, being intrinsically truth?directed, is essentially passive. I argue that while this may be true of belief proper, understood as a kind of disposition, it is not true of acts of assent or ?judgment?. Judgments, I contend, must be deemed voluntary precisely because of their truth?aimedness, for in their case (...) this feature entails that they can always be regarded as the subjects of a kind of implicit practical reasoning. By emphasizing the familiar point that voluntariness need not involve anything more than this, and by invoking the soft determinist option of holding causation to be compatible with choice, I seek to deflect some anticipated objections to this argument. (shrink)

Introduction : a great reversal? -- Justifying morality -- Groundwork 3 : an enigmatic text -- The second critique -- Groundwork 2 : rational nature as an end-in-itself? -- From rational agency to freedom -- From freedom to non-phenomenal -- From non-phenomenality to universality -- The identity of persons -- Recovering the categorical imperative.

Employers must determine the types of health care plans to offer and also set employee premiums for each plan provided. Depending on the structure of the employee share of premiums across different health insurance plans, the incentives to choose one plan over another are altered. If employees know premiums do not fully reflect the risk differences among workers, such pricing can give rise to a so-called “death spiral” due to adverse selection. This paper uses longitudinal information from a natural experiment (...) in the management of health benefits for a large employer to explore the impact of moving from a fixed-dollar contribution policy to a partially risk-adjusted employer contribution policy. Our results show that implementing a significant risk adjustment had no discernable effect on adverse selection against the most generous indemnity insurance policy. This stands in stark contrast to previous studies, which have tended to estimate large impacts attributed to selection when employers move to a fixed-dollar policy from one with some risk adjustment. Further analysis suggests that previous studies, which appeared to detect plans in the throes of a death spiral, may instead have been reflecting an inexorable movement away from a non-preferred product, one that would have been inefficient for nearly all workers even in the absence of adverse selection. (shrink)

I contend that while at least one of the arguments advanced by Bernard Williams in his paper ‘Deciding To Believe’ does establish that beliefs, or more precisely, judgements cannot be decided upon ‘at will’, the notion of truth‐aimedness presupposed by that argument also, ironically, provides the key to understanding why judgements are necessarily voluntary.

I contend that while at least one of the arguments advanced by Bernard Williams in his paper ‘Deciding To Believe’ does establish that beliefs, or more precisely, judgements cannot be decided upon ‘at will’, the notion of truth‐aimedness presupposed by that argument also, ironically, provides the key to understanding why judgements are necessarily voluntary.

Philosophy of science has traditionally focused on the epistemological dimensions of scientific practice at the expense of the ethical and political questions scientists encounter when addressing questions of policy in advisory contexts. In this article, I will explore how an exclusive focus on epistemology and theoretical reason can function to reinforce common, yet flawed assumptions concerning the role of scientific knowledge in policy decision making when reproduced in philosophy courses for science students. In order to address this concern, I will (...) argue that such courses should supplement the traditional focus on theoretical reason with an analysis of the practical reasoning employed by scientists in advisory contexts. Later sections of this paper outline a teaching strategy by which this can be achieved that consists of two steps: the first examines idealized examples of scientific advising in order to highlight the irreducible role played by moral reasoning in justifying policy recommendations. The second employs argument analysis to reveal implicit moral assumptions in actual advisory reports that form the basis for class discussion. This paper concludes by examining some of the wider benefits that can be expected from adopting such an approach. (shrink)

It is commonly thought, in line with the position defended in an influential paper by David Lewis, that the decision problems faced in the prisoner’s dilemma and the Newcomb situation are essentially the same problem. José Luis Bermúdez has recently attacked the case Lewis makes for this claim. While I think the claim is false, I contend that Bermúdez’s reason for rejecting Lewis’s argument is inadequate, and then outline what I take to be a better reason for doing so.

This article aims to challenge the thesis of the craft origins of scientific empiricism by demonstrating how the empirical practices of early experimentalism differed in significant ways from the activities of artisans. Through a phenomenological analysis of instrumental observation and experimental demonstrations, I aim to show how experimentalism privileged modes of experience that were foreign to craft traditions and which facilitated a newfound estrangement of human subjects from the objects of their knowledge. Firstly, we will review concerns surrounding the promotion (...) of optical instruments by early experimentalists to reveal how these technologies were understood not only to amplify the senses but also to obscure contextual and relative qualities available to unaided visual perception. Secondly, we will examine the experimental practices of the early Royal Society, to see how experimental demonstrations were deliberately structured to facilitate experiences of the natural world that were divorced from practical and personal contexts. It is here that the divergence from artisanal epistemology is rendered most apparent. For in contrast to craft practices, which favored forms of experience which were personal and engaged, I will argue that the new scientific practices of the 17th century played a central role in effecting the researcher's transformation into a new kind of epistemological subject – the spectator. (shrink)

It is common to view the technologies that surround us as either tools or machines. This distinction is often understood to reflect a difference between kinds of technology: those which operate by human agency, and those which operate by their own, technological form of performative agency. This paper aims to explore how common arguments for the performative agency of machines ultimately fail to establish the claim that anything other than humans are capable of performing tasks. In light of such problems, (...) I will propose an alternative conception which understands machines to be distinguished by the way in which the human agency on which they depend is concealed. After examining reasons why we should consider this concealment to represent a social rather than technological phenomenon, this paper concludes by exploring implications this view holds for the way in which the ethics of automation is approached in the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of "action" standardly take an action to be a doing which _satisfies some description that is semantically related to the content of a propositional attitude of the subject's which _explains why that doing occurred. Causal theories of action require that the explanation in question must involve the causation of action-doings by propositional attitudes (typically intentions, volitions, or combinations of belief and desire). I argue that there are actions whose status, as such, cannot be acknowledged by any causal theory, (...) since no such theory can allow that they fulfill the satisfaction condition. (shrink)

Against the contention of David Lewis Philosophy and Public Affairs 8, 235–240, that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem, José Luis Bermúdez Analysis 73, 423–429, has urged that Lewis’s assimilation removes the very outcome scenarios that make the Dilemma so puzzling. I objected that this criticism of Lewis presupposes that the Dilemma is harder to resolve than Newcomb’s Problem, in effect challenging Bermúdez to justify this assumption. In his 2015 he takes up the challenge, arguing that while the former (...) presents a problem of strategic choice the latter is problem of parametric choice. I argue here that appeal to the distinction between these two kinds of choice cannot sustain the rejection of Lewis’s view. (shrink)

Philosophical analyses of scientific methodology have long understood intuition to be incompatible with a rule based reasoning that is often considered necessary for a rational scientific method. This paper seeks to challenge this contention by highlighting the indispensable role that intuition plays in the application of methodologies for scientific discovery. In particular, it seeks to outline a positive role for intuition and personal judgment in scientific discovery by exploring a comparison between the use of heuristic reasoning in scientific practice and (...) engineering design. While these discussions share many features, it will also be shown that the successful use of heuristics in engineering design is often considered to depend on a crucial factor that is markedly absent from accounts of the use of heuristics in scientific discovery; experienced judgment. In the final sections of this paper, I will compare attitudes to the role of computer analysis in scientific and engineering practices, with the aim of showing how the limitations of scientific discovery machines reveal the need for including intuition in philosophical accounts of heuristic reasoning in scientific discovery. (shrink)

We discuss the cities of the future, and how they might co-habit with the biosphere in a more mutually beneficial way. Mutualistic cities would blend with their local ecology, co-existing with the immediately available resources of water, life, energy and materials, and enhancing the biosphere so that many species can thrive, including people. Such cities can make a significant contribution to stabilizing the Earth System by sustaining and nurturing life in tune with the evolving local ecology through cyclic economies and (...) values prioritizing mutually supportive communities over economic growth. The term “mutualism” comes from biology, referring to inter-species relationships that are beneficial. Mutualistic cities would benefit human and non-human inhabitants by recycling materials, clean air, and water, and providing habitats for many species. (shrink)

My goal in this article is to explore the extent to which the conception of rule-following which emerges from Wittgenstein’s later works can also yield important insights concerning the nature of technological practices. In particular, this article aims to examine how two interrelated themes of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations can be applied in the philosophical analysis of technology. Our first theme concerns linguistic practice; broadly construed, it is the claim that the use of language cannot be understood as determined by a (...) system of context independent rules. The second, interrelated theme emerges as a consequence of the first; that the meaning of language is rendered indeterminate when analyzed in isolation from contexts of practice. Following the common tendency in the sociology of technology to draw analogies between language and technology, I aim to show how the arguments that Wittgenstein makes for these two claims concerning language can also help us to understand the relation between technical artifacts and technological practices. For, similar to Wittgenstein’s account of rules, it will be shown how artifacts cannot be adequately understood in isolation from a wider background of skillful practice and interpretation. To illustrate this idea, we will examine the case of the Geiger counter, with a view towards illustrating how important aspects of the function of the device are rendered indeterminate when assessed on the basis of physical design alone. (shrink)

Since Aristotle, it has been common to understand wonder as a psychological state characterized by an absence of rational understanding. Drawing on this idea, a number of historians have suggested that the wonder which had long characterized the experience of automata, declined in the early modern period alongside the increased availability of theoretical treatises on mechanics. This article seeks to challenge this view by examining the relationship between rational and practical modes of technical understanding in John Wilkins’ Mathematicall Magick (1648). (...) My aim is to show that a close reading of the second book of the Mathematicall Magick reveals an alternative conception of wonder as an experience of skilled workmanship that both tolerates theoretical understanding and is increased through practical experience. It will be my claim that the conception of technical wonder which emerges from Wilkin’s descriptions of automata, reveals how the concept of Aristotelian wonder is too reductive to capture the variety of ways in which mechanical technology was experienced in early modern England. (shrink)

This paper aims to assess the credibility of the legitimation thesis; the claim that the development of experimental science involved a legitimation of certain aspects of artisanal practice or craft knowledge. My goal will be to provide a critique of this idea by examining Francis Bacon’s notion of ‘mechanical history’ and the influence it exerted on attempts by later generations of scholars to appropriate the knowledge of craft traditions. Specifically, I aim to show how such projects were often premised upon (...) socio-epistemological ideals that served to reinforce, rather than relinquish boundaries between artisans and natural philosophers. It will be my claim that a closer examination of the presuppositions underlying attempts by early modern natural philosophers to appropriate craft knowledge reveals, not a desire to legitimize aspects of artisanal practice, but rather strategies aimed at demonstrating the inferiority of the local ways of knowing upon which it was based. (shrink)

When infrastructural technology is functioning correctly, it is often considered to recede from view and become invisible. According to this perspective, visibility is restored in cases of breakdown and malfunction, which for this reason, are often understood to represent important epistemic opportunities for grasping previously hidden aspects of infrastructure. This article seeks to outline the limitations of the idea that infrastructural failure has a positive epistemic function by distinguishing between two fundamentally different ways in which the nature of technological function (...) can be conceptualised; the first understands function as stemming primarily from the way a technology was designed and produced, the second as a process sustained by constant human activities of maintenance and repair. After illustrating how a number of recent studies of infrastructure build upon insights granted by the latter process perspective, this article aims to demonstrate how the experience of breakdown itself does little to facilitate a shift towards understanding infrastructure in this way. For this reason, this article ends with a suggestion for a shift in emphasis in studies of infrastructure, away from breakdown and towards a sustained examination of everyday practices of maintenance, repair and modification of infrastructural technologies. (shrink)

Despite the vast amount of work produced by philosophers, historians and sociologists on the nature of scientific activity, “observation itself is rarely the focus of attention and almost never the subject of historical inquiry in its own right”. This general lack of interest in the nature of scientific observation was perhaps most clearly reflected in the Vienna Circle’s attempt to establish an analysis of science beginning at the level of protocol sentences. To do so, of course, they had to disregard (...) the humidity and fogged lenses facing the primatologist in the jungle, or the way in which flights aboard military aircraft were once sought by physicists in order to expose... (shrink)

An imaginary desert island scenario provides the setting for a story which is designed to expose the shortcomings of deterrence, reform and restitution theories of punishment, and to emphasize the intuitive appeal of Kant's strong retributivist insistence that there is a positive obligation to punish offenders just qua offenders, and not merely an automatic right to do so (weak retributivism). Nevertheless, it is urged that though the fact that an offence has been committed can in itself suffice to establish that (...) punishment is in some sense required, this requirement at most supports a position that is intermediate between Kantian retributivism and weak retributivism. (shrink)

Dynamically transforming the elements of any performing artist’s craft, this practical guide is a must-have for musicians, dancers, and actors. The handbook shows how artistic performance is embodied in the unification of three critical elements—motion, emotion, and love—demonstrating how it offers experiences and opportunities distinct from the nonperforming arts. Step-by-step guidelines are provided for building intentional and inspirational practice time, thereby enhancing the relationships between the source, the performer, and the audience. Illustrating how intentional movement invokes emotions from both the (...) performer and the audience and how the concept of love gives a performance humanity and life, this eye-opening exploration creates pathways for achieving true artistry. (shrink)

There is, of course, one clear sense in which Spinoza’s axiomatic method is a method of presentation: this is the sense which contrasts a method of presentation with a method of discovery. In the Ethics, Spinoza is stating and explaining his views, not describing how he arrived at them or telling us how to make discoveries for ourselves. Nor does he elsewhere present the axiomatic method as a method of discovery. In the seventeenth century, the distinction between a method of (...) discovery and a method of presentation was often described as a distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" method; Arnauld and Nicole write. (shrink)

Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment s/he forms (...) that is rationalized by those judgments. My contention is that, given the Openness Requirement, no version of Extreme Determinsim can allow for the role played by logical insight in the rationalization of judgment. I end by indicating briefly how this result might figure in a wider argument against any form of determinism about rationalized judgment, and by explaining why I have focused specifically upon rebutting a deterministic view of theoretical as opposed to 'practical' rationalization. (shrink)

What can we learn about the nature of technology by studying practices of maintenance and repair? This volume addresses this question by bringing together scholarship from philosophers of technology working at the forefront of this emerging and exciting topic. -/- The chapters in this volume explore how attending to maintenance and repair can challenge and complement existing ways of thinking about technology focused on use and design and introduce new philosophical perspectives on the relationship between technology, time and human practice. (...) They examine the significance of maintenance and repair practices at different scales in relation to a diverse range of philosophical traditions and a wide variety of technologies, from urban infrastructure such as bridges and buildings to data technologies such as servers and software systems. Together, the contributions highlight common themes in the philosophical study of maintenance, including the role of skill, the significance of social values and the potential of these practices to transform the technologies to which they are applied. By reflecting on the different ways in which we keep technologies going, from the devices we use in our homes to the large technical systems which surround us, this volume reveals the philosophical significance of practices of maintenance, not only as a source of new insights but also as a resource for enriching our understanding of a variety of existing topics in philosophy. -/- Maintenance and Philosophy of Technology will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of technology, philosophy of engineering and science & technology studies. (shrink)

This is the sequel to my paper 'Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism' ( IJPS , May 2001), wherein I argued that theoretical rationalization, that is, the forming of judgments by way of inference from other judgments, cannot simply be identified with any kind of predetermination of conclusion-judgments by premise-judgments. Taking 'free' to mean 'neither mechanistically explicable nor random' (where something is mechanistically explicable if and only if it is either predetermined or probabilified in a certain way, and is random if (...) and only if it is not why-explicable at all) I attempt here to establish that all judgments, whether rationalized or not, are necessarily free. (shrink)

This is an interdisciplinary collection of new essays by philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and historians on the question: What has determined and what should determine the territory or the boundaries of the discipline named "psychology"? Both the contents - in terms of concepts - and the methods - in terms of instruments - are analyzed. Among the contributors are Mitchell Ash, Paul Baltes, Jochen Brandtstädter, Gerd Gigerenzer, Michael Heidelberger, Gerhard Roth, and Thomas Sturm.

This collection contains the following sixteen essays: "Some Pivotal Issues in Spinoza," by Paul Weiss; "The Deductive Character of Spinoza's Metaphysics," by Michael Hooker; "Spinoza's Ontological Proof," by Willis Doney; "Spinozistic Anomalies," by Jose Benardete; "Some Idealistic Themes in the Ethics," by Robert N. Beck; "Spinoza's Dualism," by Alan Donagan; "Objects, Ideas, and 'Minds': Comments on Spinoza's Theory of Mind," by Margaret D. Wilson; "Parallelism and Complementarity: The Psycho-Physical Problem in the Succession of Niels Bohr," by Hans Jonas; "Spinoza's Political (...) Philosophy: The Lessons and Problems of a Conservative Democrat," by Lewis S. Feuer; "Notes on Spinoza's Critique of Religion," by Hilail Gilden [[sic]] ; "Spinoza and History," by James C. Morrison; "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," by Henry E. Allison; "Hegel's Assessment of Spinoza," by Kenneth L. Schmitz; "Spinoza's Logic of Inquiry: Rationalist or Experientialist?" by Isaac Franck; "De Natura," by Stewart Umphrey; "Analytic and Synthetic Methods in Spinoza's Ethics," by Richard Kennington. (shrink)

What roles have instruments played in psychology and related disciplines? How have instruments affected the dynamics of psychological research, with what possibilities and limits? What is a psychological instrument? This paper provides a conceptual foundation for specific case studies concerning such questions. The discussion begins by challenging widely accepted assumptions about the subject and analyzing the general relations between scientific experimentation and the uses of instruments in psychology. Building on this analysis, a deliberately inclusive definition of what constitutes a psychological (...) instrument is proposed. The discussion then takes up the relation between instrumentation and theories, and differentiates in greater detail the roles instruments have had over the course of psychology’s history. Finally, the authors offer an approach to evaluating the possibilities and limitations of instruments in psychology. (shrink)

Originally published in 1934, this book contains the last three books of the Latin text of Cicero's Disputations at Tusculum, the second volume of Dougan's two-volume critical edition of the text. The Latin is accompanied by a running commentary, and Dougan provides an introduction on the arguments contained in the books and the manuscript sources for the text. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the works of Cicero.

It is commonly recognized that the modern capacity for mass online communication carries various dangers: fake news, rampant conspiracy theories, trolling, and so forth. It is less commonly realized that moral problems remain when the contents of online communications are completely innocuous. This article discusses one of the noteworthy features of modern digital technology, the fact that it is possible to precisely target specific audiences, and argues that this can make mass communications such as advertising and political campaigns morally problematic. (...) What is more, this holds even if the communicator is using only rational persuasion. In being selective about who sees which arguments, one becomes liable to mislead the audience despite sticking to honest, evidence-based, rational argumentation. (shrink)

The Gamer’s Dilemma challenges us to justify the moral difference between enacting virtual murder and virtual child molestation in video games. The Dilemma relies for its argumentative force on the claim that there is an intuitive moral difference between these acts, with the former intuited as morally acceptable and the latter as morally unacceptable. However, there has been no empirical investigation of these claims. To explore these issues, we developed an experimental survey study in which participants were asked to reflect (...) on imaginary video game scenarios as part of a 2 (undertake virtual murder or molestation) X 2 (against an adult or child) X 2 (in a high or low realism virtual environment) factorial design. We found that there was a significant difference between people’s views about virtual murder and virtual molestation. Whether the virtual act was performed against an adult or child was non-significant in most conditions, whereas whether it was performed in a high or low realism virtual environment was significant in most conditions. Gender did not impact these results, whereas perceived gaming experience, hours of video game play per week, and integrity did. These results provide an empirical grounding for future discussions of the Gamer's Dilemma. (shrink)